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RAPPORT DE RECHERCHE
A PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE OF
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION
MATHIEU MAGNAUDET, STÉPHANE CONVERSY, AND STÉPHANE CHATTY
Abstract. Since the birth of the field, HCI has defined itself both as a theory of the
relations between humans and numerical systems and as a practical activity that aims
at building new interactive systems. However, HCI has not yet succeeded in discovering
a unified theoretical framework nor in building a strong link between both activities.
Based on an analysis from various fields, we show that most of the di culties come from
the computational paradigm that is still used as a foundation of most of the theories in
HCI. This brings us to proposing a new philosophical view on the science of HCI, based
on a process ontology. We show how it accounts for several phenomena related to HCI
and unifies them. This approach lends itself to new ways of thinking and programming
interaction at di↵erent scales, which may help HCI scientists in their modelling and design
activities.
1. Introduction
Since its early days in the 1960s, the discipline of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI)
has been defined with a twofold objective: being a scientific discipline able to describe,
predict and explain the relationships between humans and computers, and being an engi-
neering discipline aimed at designing better interactive computing systems. This clearly
shows in the ACM definition [34]:
Human-computer interaction is a discipline concerned with the design, eval-
uation and implementation of interactive computing systems for human use
and with the study of major phenomena surrounding them.
Although it is di cult to find comparable definitions of other scientific fields, this project
is by many aspects analogue to the articulation between physics and engineering physics
or between chemistry and chemical engineering i.e., the derivation of engineering methods
and processes from a scientific corpus. However, the specificity of HCI is that there is not
yet a firm scientific body of knowledge upon which to build an engineering field. There
is not such a thing as a unified, uncontroversial, theory of human-computer interaction.
This diagnosis has already been made, notably by Yvonne Rogers [66]. Her review of
the literature from the last 30 years reveals an heterogeneous and overabundant set of
theoretical frameworks. Moreover, according to her study, it appears that the professionals
involved in the design of interactive computing systems do not base their activity upon
any of these theoretical framework but rather on a set of recipes and good practices.
We as a community could accept this fact and just consider that the object of HCI is
so complex that we cannot hope to build a strong unified theory, in which case we could
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satisfy ourselves with inventing new interaction techniques and building partial and local
theories. But beyond intellectual discomfort, the lack of firm theoretical background and
the impossibility to derive e↵ective design methods from a theory have practical conse-
quences. The first one has been clearly captured by Greenberg and Thimbebly with the
expression “weak science” [31], by which they mean the di culty to manage a growing
body of knowledge, the di culty to replicate experiments, and that of having clear evalu-
ation criteria for assessing the value of a contribution to the progress of knowledge. Thus,
a recent study shows the apparent inability of the HCI community to focus on specific,
structuring, research topics [43]. Not surprisingly, it seems that this theoretical weakness
has some consequences on the academic recognition received by the community [73].
A second consequence is the di culty to build an educational program for students in
HCI design. To start with, what is the need to teach them the various existing theoretical
frameworks if they are of no use in their future practice? Then, if there is no agreement
about which theory to teach, how can we do more than just collecting good practices?
A third problematic consequence is the di culty to reuse HCI innovation in industrial
processes, especially in the development of safety critical systems. As long as it confines
to an empirical discipline, HCI cannot fully satisfy the current strong demand on proof of
safety or formal verification of interactive systems.
Solutions have been proposed to tackle these various issues, ranging from unification
attempts [22] to the derivation of design methods from a theoretical framework [9, 20]. In
a more pessimistic move, some researchers even suggest to give up any general theory and
to create an intermediate level of knowledge, somewhere between theory and practice [37].
While we share the diagnosis of most of these papers, our approach here is noticeably
di↵erent. We propose a philosophical analysis that aims at improving our understanding
of the very object of the science of human-computer interaction and, consequently, to
outline what could be the principles for a theory of this object.
In the first part of this paper we recall that the situation has not always been so un-
favourable and we come back to the initial intentions behind the science of human-computer
interaction and its underlying paradigm, the computational theory of the mind. Then we
present some of the criticisms addressed to this paradigm and we show that they all point
at its inability to account for major phenomena in HCI as well as in cognitive science and
even in computer science. In the third part, from a thorough analysis of the object of the
science of HCI, and the observation of an ontological shift in contemporary science, we
suggest a new theoretical direction based on the concept of process. Finally we explore
some possible consequences of this shift for the science of HCI.
2. Cognition and computation
There are at least two ways to tell the history of HCI. The first way focuses on technology
and browses the successive inventions in the field and the new interaction techniques that
they enable. Brad Myers’ brief history of HCI, for example, takes this approach [56]. The
second way focuses on the various theoretical trends from the 1960s to nowadays [66]. This
is the one which interests us here. Our thesis is that the theoretical crisis in HCI is strongly
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related to a crisis in its initial structuring paradigm i.e. the computational approach to
cognition.
2.1. The origins. As suggested by its name, human-computer interaction borrows most
of its theoretical content from two fields: the social sciences, specifically psychology, and
the sciences of the artificial [74]. But the two apparently independent bodies of knowledge
combined in HCI have a common root. This root is in the cybernetics movement that
emerged just after World War II [88], and, one step upstream, the seminal 1936 paper by
Alan Turing [82]. This history is well known [30, 33, 25] but it is worth recalling a few
aspects of one of the major contributions of Turing’s paper, the cross-comparison between
the brain and the computer.
While originally intended as a contribution to the foundation of arithmetics, Turing’s
paper had a wider audience than just mathematicians. Indeed, his formal work on com-
putable numbers is the first convincing formulation of an equivalence relation between the
operation of the human mind and that of a logical machine. In all honesty, Turing did not
tell very much about the human mind and it was not his goal. In particular, he never said
that the mind is embodied in a machine whose functional architecture is isomorphic to a
Turing machine. But Turing’s thesis establishes a weak equivalence relation by setting that
for each task that a human can perform with a pen and a paper, his logical automaton can
produce an equivalent result. In other words, for a given input, a human calculator and a
Turing machine will produce the same result.
It is only few years later, in 1943, that a stronger thesis has been formulated [53]. In their
paper, McCulloch and Pitts proposed a computational model of how the brain operates.
By taking neurons as a set of very simple calculators connected in a network, they tried to
show that this machinery has a computational power equivalent to that of a Turing machine
. Thus, they provided the missing link that allows to reason about the human mind as
a kind of computing machine. Not only the Turing machine can do whatever the human
mind does, but the brain itself can be modelled as a logical automaton. This hypothesis,
explored by the cybernetics movement during the famous Macy Conferences, provided a
basis for the foundation of a new materialist science of the mind. In a critical paper, John
Searle summarised its basic principle: “the mind is to the brain as the program is to the
hardware” [69].
Of course, the cybernetics movement is richer than this simple statement. It provided
many seminal ideas about control loops, feedback and auto-regulation mechanisms, to
cite a few. However its main heritage in contemporary cognitive science consists in this
computational metaphor that allowed the constitution of a truly structuring paradigm.
2.2. The computational paradigm. We can find various expressions of the above equiv-
alence relation in all fields constitutive of cognitive science: cognitive linguistics [17], cog-
nitive psychology [63], cognitive neuroscience [18], philosophy of mind [62], and computer
science [57, 58].
One reason for the popularity of this thesis is probably that it allows the scientific study
of an object, the mind, that was formerly reserved to metaphysics or religious thinking.
Philosophers of cognitive science use the expression “naturalising the mind” [24] to account
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for this process of appropriation of the mind by natural sciences. But, more than a simple
theory, this approach founds a paradigm i.e. a framework that structures a research field
in the Kuhnean sense [45]. Indeed, it provides the delineation of a phenomenal field, a set
of concepts to categorise it, the formulation of a set of problems that must be solved, and
a specification of the possible forms that answers to these problems can take. In summary,
it brings all that is needed by scientists and engineers to structure their daily activities.
It is important to note that the computational paradigm cannot be reduced to the
computational metaphor, as it also conveys a specific way of thinking about computers
and computational processes. The key concept, also derived from Turing’ works, is that
of algorithm. Within the paradigm, the scientific problems are expressed in algorithmic-
related terms. This clearly appears, for example, in the work of David Marr and Tomasio
Poggio on the neurophysiology of vision, with their proposal for a three- or four- level
analysis of cognitive processes [52]. According to them, at the upper level scientists start
their investigation by formulating the computational problem that the cognitive process is
solving. This can be done, for example, by finding an arithmetic expression that specifies
the mapping between a set of inputs and a set of outputs. One level below, scientists have
to hypothesise an algorithm allowing to compute this function. Finally, they have to find
the mechanism, or the functional architecture, that implements this algorithm. In a similar
approach, Zenon Pylyshyn proposed an algorithmic-oriented level decomposition to guide
the research in cognitive psychology [63].
The computational paradigm rests on the concepts of problem solving, function, input-
output mapping, programs, algorithms, functional architecture to cite a few. Brain or
psychological phenomena must be thought out as transformation processes from a set of
inputs to a set of outputs. And some legitimate questions are: what are the various func-
tions realised by a cognitive system? What is the algorithm that would allow computing
this function? What is the functional architecture that would realise this algorithm?
The computational paradigm also implicitly defines norms and criteria about what is an
acceptable explanation of a cognitive phenomena. In particular, one of the basic assump-
tions of this paradigm is that if we can build a computational model of a cognitive process
then we know at least one machine able to realise it i.e. a computer. As Jerry Fodor [28,
p. 13-14] explained, the Turing-calculability of a cognitive model is a safeguard against
magical explanations of mental phenomena. This warrants that we stay at all times within
the boundaries of a natural science of the mind.
2.3. The computational paradigm in HCI. The role of the computational paradigm
in the constitution of the field of HCI is easily understandable: if the humain mind and
the computer are thought of as two machines of the same kind, able to execute the same
functions, then we can consider the possibility to substitute or to augment one by the
other. This is the path taken, for example, by Licklider and Engelbart in two classical
papers known for their influence in the field [48, 26].
Note, however, that if we talk about human-computer interaction, it is because the
substitution is not complete. The reasons invoked for this incompleteness are various.
Some argued that our knowledge about human cognition is insu cient or that computers
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are not powerful enough. Others, like Licklider, had a more skeptical stance about the very
project of a complete substitution such as expressed in the field of artificial intelligence. It
seems that Licklider never believed in the strong equivalence between mind and computing
machines. But everyone seems to agree that many tasks can be made easier through a kind
of interaction between humans and computers, and this opened the door for a completely
new research program. On the one hand, there is the issue of process distribution between
humans and computers, following the seminal work of Fitts and his MABA-MABA list [27]:
who is better at doing what? On the other hand, there is the issue of interaction techniques
or interaction modalities: what is the best way for a human to interact with a computer?
And this paves the way toward the invention and evaluation of new interaction modalities.
The influence of the computational paradigm over the field of HCI appears more clearly
with the concept of cognitive architecture. Cognitive architectures, such as SOAR [46] or
ACT-R [1, 2], are executable models describing the alleged functional architecture of the
human cognitive system. They are strongly related to the current progress in cognitive
psychology, which refines the decomposition of the cognitive system in functional modules.
They are also used within the field of HCI: Newell, Card, and Moran, for example, de-
veloped a human processor model [15] that serves as a theoretical basis for GOMS and
KLM.
Historically, the computational paradigm strongly shaped the way of conceptualising
Human-Computer Interaction. Indeed, if humans and computers are two kinds of cogni-
tive systems, and if a cognitive system is a symbolic information processor, then human-
computer interaction is just an information-processing related activity. The complete
human-computer system transmits, stores, handles information. Thus, human-computer
interaction is primarily thought as an informational interaction or, as proposed by Brey [13],
as an epistemic interaction, i.e. a knowledge exchange.
Classic task analysis is another consequence of this way of thinking the human mind
as a kind of computational system. A task can be split up in goals and subgoals and
its realisation can be distributed over computers and human processors. This is the very
principle of task analysis and task allocation. As Sheridan [72] puts it: “we are particularly
concerned with allocation between humans and intelligent machines - computers - where the
capability of the modern machine now comes closer to that of the human than in the past”.
Thus, task distribution between humans and computers rests upon the idea of, at least, a
weak equivalence relation between the one and the other.
Task allocation does not mean a complete separation between human and machine, each
one doing its job separately. Conversely, according to Sheridan, there is a complete range of
possible cooperation modes. However, the interaction model that stems from this analysis
is the question-answer schemata such as illustrated by Turing’s imitation game[81]: each
system gives an input to the other; the computer may furnish a piece of information, a list
of possible options for example, while the human may enter a list of commands, such as
the selection of one of the proposed options.
At this point, one may ask whether this model can account for any kind of interaction
between a human and a computer. What about, for example, the continuous move of a
finger over a sensitive surface, or the handling of a joystick or a steering wheel to maintain
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a system parameter within its safe boundaries? At first sight, there is no obvious way to
describe such situations within the question-answer schema. Of course, the computational
paradigm produced many rich and interesting results that we do not intend to contest. But
one can question its ability to provide an adequate descriptive and explanatory framework
for every phenomena surrounding human-machine interaction. As we will now see, the
issues are deep and numerous.
3. The computational paradigm against its criticisms
The computational paradigm received many criticisms since its appearance in the 1950s.
Some of them led to a more or less sophisticated refinement of existing theories. Others
adopted a more radical stance and called into question the basic principles that we presented
above. We analyse here some of the criticisms from three theoretical fields: HCI, the
philosophy of cognitive science, and theoretical computer science. These criticisms are well
known by the researchers of each discipline, but they are not always known outside their
respective fields. By putting them together, we intend to show their convergence toward
the idea that the computational paradigm cannot account for a wide range of phenomena
surrounding human-machine interaction, thus calling for new concepts.
3.1. Situated cognition. Suchman’s work [77] appears as the first departure from the
computational paradigm. She explicitly points the cognitivist approach, an instantiation
of the computational paradigm within the field of cognitive science. More specifically she
criticises the idea that human action should be understood as the sequential execution of
a plan previously defined and decomposable in elementary sub-actions. She puts forth the
fact that action is always situated, and that the process of decision making is localised
and strongly depends on specific circumstances. Decision making rests on the dynamic
interactions with the people and the objects constitutive of the immediate context of the
action.
Briefly stated, this line of criticism provoked three kinds of attitudes within the com-
munity. The first, directly inspired by Suchman’s work, consists in a renunciation of the
computational paradigm and in the rejection of cognition as an object of study. The theo-
retical framework becomes that of the social sciences, especially ethnology, and the primary
aim is to develop new design methods to improve the usability of human-machine systems.
Many works about participatory design seems to stem from this intellectual shift [51] as
well as works on embodied cognition [23].
A second reaction to Suchman’s criticisms consists in reinterpreting them within the
computational paradigm like Vera and Simon did [86]. In a similar vein, the works of
Hutchins [39] and Kirsh [41, 42] o↵er some extensions to the classical paradigm in order
to account for these criticisms. But they retain the idea that human action is “cognitive”
and that it involves steps of computation and information processing even if some of them
are delegated to the environment. Thus, their works appear as fully representative of the
so-called “extended mind” view of cognition [19].
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Finally, the third kind of reaction to Suchman’s work amounts to minimizing its im-
pact on the field of human-machine interaction. The continuing works about cognitive
architectures [50] appear to us as a clear illustration of this line.
The influence of Suchman’s work is undeniable and the various reactions to it partly
explain the diversity of the theoretical approaches in HCI. However it did not succeed
in providing the basis for a new paradigm, perhaps because it was too narrow in scope
and did not provide any insight on some issues studied in HCI. One can cite, for exam-
ple, the necessity to develop formalisms to assess the safety of a critical system or the
need for programming tools dedicated to the development of interactive systems. But, at
least, the literature on situated action reveals that human-computer interaction cannot
be fully understood if we reduce it to an informational interaction between two abstract
computational systems. Something more is required to account for the complex network of
interactions constitutive of human use of computing devices, the pending question being
whether we have to complete the computational approach with some exogenous theoretical
content or to proceed to its complete replacement.
3.2. The dynamical approach to cognition. Within the field of cognitive science and
philosophy of mind, the criticisms against the computational approach are numerous and
varied. Some of them are close to Suchman’s, such as the embodied approach to cogni-
tion [85, 79]. In a di↵erent attempt, some researchers tried to show that the capabilities
of the human mind exceed those of a Turing machine, and consequently that we cannot
reduce the one to the other (cf. [49] and more recently [60]). Others insisted on the dif-
ficulty for this paradigm to account for some alleged properties of mental states such as
intentionality [69] or phenomenal consciousness [12]. But in the beginning of the 1990s
a new type of criticism emerged, accompanied with the proposal of a new paradigm: the
dynamical approach to cognition [61].
One of the reasons motivating this new trend is the thesis, coming from the situated and
embodied approaches to cognition, that cognition cannot be understood from the unique
study of the intra-cranial processes. Cognition should be better viewed as the result of
the complex interactions between brain, the dynamics of the body, and environmental
variations [10]. In addition, a strong emphasis is put on the temporal dimension of the
interactions between these various systems. According to its supporters, the concept of
time from computability theory and reduced to the number of steps necessary to solve a
problem, is not suited to account for the continuous changes characterising cognition [83].
“Dynamicism” thus proposes to appeal to another, more adequate formalism: the math-
ematical theory of dynamic systems. This theory rests upon a qualitative approach to
di↵erential equations for which there is no analytic solution [35], and is focused on the
evolving behaviour of the system along the time. It allows to characterise some of its prop-
erties such as attractors (fixed point, limit cycle, strange attractor, etc.) or bifurcations.
The adoption of this point of view over cognitive phenomena has important consequences.
They are no more seen as functions producing an output from an input through an al-
gorithm. Dynamicists are more interested in the asymptotic behaviour of the cognitive
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system, its properties of stability, its convergence toward a specific state, or at the oppo-
site its oscillatory behaviour. A dynamical approach to decision making for example, shows
the oscillatory nature of the mental states before the convergence toward a specific choice.
As put by Townsend and Busemeyer, the dynamical approach succeeds where the classi-
cal algorithmic approach fails in its ability to describe “the variability and the temporal
evolution of preferences” [80].
In defence of their theory, the proponents of this approach often argue that it introduces
a continuity between the usual vocabulary of the natural sciences and those of the science
of cognitive phenomena [84]. This is actually a desirable property; however this also points
toward a weakness of this approach. Indeed, it seems di cult to build a structuring
paradigm out of the simple request to adopt the formalism of dynamical systems. The
dynamical approach is quite silent, for example, about which cognitive variables should be
modelled. More generally we hardly find the expression of a concrete research program
with a set of questions and the specification of a methodology to study them (however
see [16] for an attempt). As a consequence, from an HCI point of view, it provides no
immediate resource to build a design framework.
Despite this limitation, two points deserve our attention. First, the dynamical approach
sheds light on the inability of the computational paradigm to account for some properties
of cognitive phenomena, especially their temporal structure. Second, it reinforces the
idea, already set by the situated, embodied approach that there is a need for a unified
theoretical framework to understand and model the interactions between phenomena of
di↵erent nature.
3.3. Process algebra and reactive systems. Up to now we focused our analysis on the
role of the computational paradigm in the field of cognitive science. But it is interesting
to note that criticisms also appeared in the domain of theoretical computer science at the
end of the 70s, notably with the works of Hoare [36] and Milner [55].
Theirs was not a criticism about the validity of the classic computation theory but about
its ability to account for some properties of communicating systems. Indeed, computers
quickly moved from the initial computing machines with a single central processing unit
toward more complex systems equipped with multiple processors and various communicat-
ing sub-systems acting in parallel. With those systems, a new range of problems appeared
related to the interaction between processes. We can cite for example the issue of the
distribution of processes over multiple processors, their synchronisation, or deadlocks and
concurrent access to resources. It appeared that the classic computation theory did not
have the conceptual tools to reason about these problems, thus the need for new formalisms
such as process algebra [6].
Beside these works, also appeared the concept of reactive systems [11] and the related
issue of the engineering of systems that react in real-time to multiple asynchronous sources
of events. More recently, the works about cyber-physical systems also stress the importance
of introducing a di↵erent concept of time in computing processes [47], a demand consonant
with that of the dynamical approach to cognition. In both cases, this reveals the need
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to build new abstractions and new languages to cope with some problems ignored by the
computation theory.
Note that neither process algebra nor reactive systems theory intend to exceed the
expressive power of the Turing machine such as is sometimes suggested by the proponents
of the concept of hypercomputation [21]. The idea is rather to address other issues than the
characterisation of the set of computable functions, the classification of formal automata
or the study of algorithmic complexity. This is a matter of filling in the explanatory gap
of the theory in a similar way as those exposed in the previous section.
At the opposite, Wegner produced an important work to characterise the concept of
interactive system. In asserting their superiority over Turing machines [87], he stayed
within the classic computational paradigm and did not propose a new one that would
better fit the range of concerns related to them.
4. The object of the science of HCI
The previous analysis calls for a new structuring theoretical ground to step aside from
the computational paradigm. However, we cannot propose a new framework without a
clear characterisation of the phenomena at stake. So what exactly is the object of HCI?
4.1. An endless diversity. The diversity in HCI is not only in the successive conceptual
frameworks that have been elaborated in the field, but also in the studied phenomena and
the scientific questions about them. When looking for the objects studied in HCI, we find
a combination of design spaces exploration triggered by the appearing of a new technology,
software architecture studies, basic researches on human cognition, action and cooperation,
investigations on engineering methods, etc.
As a consequence, there are several ways to describe HCI. At some point it was a branch
of computer science that possibly borrows some content from other fields with one goal:
designing interactive computing systems. This is probably still the common conception in
the other scientific fields, that see HCI as an “applied” computer science. One can also
see it as a composition of computer and cognitive sciences as originally conceived by the
computational paradigm. This view has been pregnant in various industries. Finally, one
can see HCI as the science of the interaction between human and computers built from the
knowledge produced by other fields, thus focused on the relation rather than on the relata.
This last approach has been adopted by many researchers of the field. However, this
characterisation does not go without di culties. Indeed, it puts a special focus on the
human-computer channel, which easily brings back to the computational paradigm as a
common ground between humans and computers. This focus also tends to exclude from
theoretical frameworks any surrounding phenomena such as the other physical systems
that may interact with the computer and/or the human user. But more importantly, the
properties of the human-computer channel are continuously evolving with the introduction
of new technologies: HCI started with data forms, dramatically changed with graphical
interfaces, then discovered multi-modality, augmented reality, and finally tangibility that
brings it to rediscovering the interaction between human and physical objects.
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However beneficial it is to the field, this closed link with technological innovation reg-
ularly causes the import of new phenomena and new conceptual frameworks that were
previously considered as foreign: physiology of perception, signal processing, the physics
of force feedback, holography, and so on. Every interaction phenomenon, be they elec-
tromagnetism, gravitational fields, chemical reactions, exchanges of information between
algorithms or human relationships can possibly play a significant role in HCI. Thus, it
seems to be a real challenge to maintain a unified conceptual framework for the field.
4.2. The science of interactions, for designers. To cope with this di culty, recent
works in HCI have pointed out the need to focus on interaction and to provide a definition
that fits the need of HCI studies [38, 76]. We fully agree that interaction is the real object
of HCI, but we still have to define its theoretical goal and to structure its method of
investigation. There is a need of a conceptual framework that accounts for each interaction
phenomenon that may occur in a human-machine system, in a unified and systematic way,
still avoiding to be the simple addition of the science of each of these phenomena.
It is worth recalling that HCI studies actually involve three stakeholders: an artefact, a
user, and a designer. However, they do not have the same status. The common ground to
all actors of the community is the interactive artefact. This is what guides the development
of the field and its boundaries. Human cognition, for example, is of interest to HCI only as
far as it is involved in the use of computer-based artefacts. In the same way, skin chemistry
will presumably become interesting for HCI as soon as we enable humans to interact with
skin [90].
Thus, not only do we need a conceptual framework for describing interaction, but it
is also required that this framework be usable in the design process of a computer-based
artefact. This is where the designer jumps in: the role of the designer in HCI is to shape
interaction, to “program” it. Of course, as a science, HCI expects to have some descrip-
tive theories about interaction, one of its model being the famous Fitts Law [32]. But,
considering its practical dimension, a theory in HCI is important only as far as it can be
used by a designer. HCI aims at providing computer-based objects designers with every
model and theory that allowing to plan the interactions between these objects and their
environment. This covers the programming i.e. the definition of the future behaviour of the
system during the design process, and the modelling to analyse the behaviour of already
existing systems. In our view, the role of the designer in the use and evaluation of theories
what makes HCI di↵erent from most scientific disciplines.
5. Thinking interaction
As we have characterised it above, HCI inherits traits from natural and human sciences,
and from design, computer science and engineering. From the two former it inherits the
description of interactions, from the two latter the concern for supporting designers. In
order to develop a proper theoretical contribution, we thus propose that HCI moves toward
a general theory of interaction. HCI must be able to go beyond the individual sciences and
to account for the phenomena in an homogeneous way so as to reduce the gap between the
way we describe a computer-based interactive system and the way we build it.
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5.1. The need for an ontology. The quest for homogeneity has been a recurrent concern
in the history of science especially in the 17th century. One way to address this issue is
to set up an ontology, i.e. to propose a categorisation of the basic constituents of the
world. At the most abstract level, when considering ontologies we are faced with two main
choices. The first is a substantialist ontology, and the distinction between the substance
and its attributes such as found in the philosophy of Plato or Descartes. Natural sciences
strongly rely on this distinction between objects and attributes, and on this uniformisation
of nature. It is the basic principle behind our contemporary view that the world can be
fully described as a complex configuration of atoms, themselves thought as very small
objects. Moreover, this ontology fits well with our ordinary experience of the objects
as persisting and countable entities, localised in space and time, to which we attribute
properties. Substantialism also inspired Alan Kay when he designed the object-oriented
approach in computer science [40].
However, other kinds of ontologies exist that put in the first place the concept of pro-
cess [71, 65]. Indeed, our experience of the world is not simply made of objects and their
attributes. Many sentences of the ordinary language do not fit in substantialist ontologies:
“it rains”, “the room temperature is decreasing”, “the fire is propagating quickly”, etc.
These sentences do not have a well-defined entity, thing or person, as their subject; they
denote processes i.e., these aspects of human experience mainly characterised by changes.
As we will try to show, processes provide an adequate theoretical background for a proper
theory of interaction.
5.2. The case for a process-based ontology. Focusing on processes leads to stop fo-
cusing on the precise nature of the elements that are interacting. The point of interest
becomes the structure of change and the structure of its propagation from a process to
another one, that is the structure of the interaction process itself. For instance one focuses
on a flow as such (its temporal and spatial evolution), without considering what is flowing:
water or lava. This is also a way to give precedence to the cause-e↵ect relationship, or to
the continuous or discrete nature of a process, over the specific nature (the attributes) of
the phenomena at stake.
In the technical vocabulary of philosophy, the passing from a substantialist ontology
to a process-based ontology is a conceptual shift. Such a shift has already occurred in
contemporary physics. Quantum field theory, one of the most supported theories in fun-
damental physics, does not find any easy interpretation within a substantialist ontology.
And indeed, many of the paradoxes of quantum physics appear solvable if one gives up the
substance-attribute schema in favour of an interactionist view of properties [44].
A similar shift occurred in biological sciences. For instance, neuronal synchronisation [75]
aims at understanding and modelling the interactions between processes distributed over
several parts of the cortex. The structure of the processes thus prevails over the nature
of the involved elements. Similarly, works about the modelling of ecosystems take as their
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main object of study the networks of interactions between living organisms as can be seen
in the presentation of the review Ecological Modeling 1.
While the dynamical approach to cognition described above does not explicitly refer to it,
we assume that it calls for such a process-based ontology when it describes the phenomena
of change and the interaction between these changes. In the same way, process algebra
in computer science considers processes as first class citizens, exclusively characterised by
their interactions with other processes. There again, the main theoretical objective is to
formalise the relationships between processes: parallelism, synchronisation, concurrence.
We claim that HCI, because it takes interaction as its primary object of study, should
follow this shift.
6. Principles of a process-based analysis of interactive systems
In the following we will try to show how a process-based ontology can be used as a
basis for a new structuring paradigm for the field of HCI. By this we mean that, like the
computational paradigm, this new paradigm can be used to circumscribe a phenomenal
field and to structure its scientific investigation.
At the most general level, we define a process as “any expression of change”: the acti-
vation of a specific user’s brain area, a finger moving on a sensitive surface, the change of
the visual appearance of a press button, and so on. The concept applies to every part of
an interactive system and can be used at any abstraction level. The user of an interac-
tive system can be considered as a single process compounded of (a possibly large number
of) sub-processes, down to the chemical reactions in her cells and to physical particles.
Likewise a computer can be considered as a process encompassing a complex entanglement
of simpler ones, down to the flow of electrons through the metal. The boundaries and
the granularity of the processes di↵er according to the system under study: the design or
modelling of a system supporting collaborative work will not focus on the same processes
as would the design of a new tangible interactor. Selecting the scope and level of analysis
is a designer’s or modeller’s choice.
Studying individual processes is the matter of various sciences: physics, chemistry, me-
chanics, etc. HCI as we mean it should not be interested in isolated processes, and should
not intend to be the science of each processes constitutive of an interactive system. The
phenomena of interest should be the causal relationships between processes: a gesture that
triggers an update of the graphics, the hand-eye coupling in target acquisition tasks, in-
terface adaptation (e.g. keyboard backlight) to environmental change (e.g. luminosity).
Following the process theory of causality elaborated by W. Salmon [67] for physical expla-
nation, we consider the causal influence between processes as a propagation of activation.
In the following we call it a coupling. A coupling can itself be described as a process, that
1We aim to understand these basic ecosystem functions using mathematical and conceptual modelling,
systems analysis, thermodynamics, computer simulations, and ecological theory. This leads to a preference
for process-based models embedded in theory with explicit causative agents as opposed to strictly statistical
or correlative descriptions.
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changes the activation state of a process according to that of another process. Reciprocal
interaction can be interpreted as a chain of couplings that creates at least one loop.
A process may have some features that determine the possible couplings with other
processes. A time-varying process can be described according to basic categories such as
oscillation, continuity, sequence of phases, etc. Couplings with other processes rest on
these properties. For example, the blinking behaviour of a visual alarm may activate a
human thought process, while the simple display of the alarm without blinking may be
ignored. This property of a process can be understood from its structure, that is the
complex arrangement of sub-processes and couplings that composed it.
According to this paradigm, the analysis of an interactive system turns into the analysis
of the features and structure of the processes at stake, and the understanding of the link
between these structures and the coupling between processes. Regarding the practical side
of the HCI field, that is the design of interactive systems, the main concern becomes the
specification of the processes that one wants to be activated or to evolve at any point of
the interaction, the identification of the expected couplings, and the implementation of the
control structures that will enable them in an artefact.
7. Revisiting the HCI body of knowledge
The conceptual shift that we suggest here does not imply giving up the huge amount
of work that has been done in the HCI field. On the contrary, one of the most important
evaluation criteria for a candidate paradigm is its ability to provide a framework for reusing
the existing knowledge. We propose here to show how the HCI body of knowlegde can be
revisited with a new, process-oriented, point of view. To this e↵ect, in the following we
present selected models from HCI and propose an interpretation within the new paradigm.
To ensure that the diversity of HCI is reflected, we chose examples from nine out of the
twelve sub-committees of the CHI2019 conference Programme Committee, leaving out only
three that are dedicated to specific areas.
7.1. User Experience and Usability. One of the key topics in usability is situation
awareness. Alarms are of particular interest in the design of safety critical interactive
systems. Some data is available on the e ciency of auditory, visual and haptic alarms;
we show here how this fits in the proposed paradigm and can help to monitor the design
process of alarms. Alarms are supposed to warn users of something that is happening in
the background, so that users can take actions if necessary. Using the process-oriented
paradigm, one can model this by considering all the systems involved, and describing their
interactions. This includes a phenomenon process (e.g. the landing gear of an aircraft
that improperly deploys), a process that monitors it with a probe (e.g. a cylinder position
tracker), a process that displays an alarm (e.g. a blinking LED), the human perception
processes (visual, in this case), and the process of executing a well-defined procedure to
solve the issue. Designing alarm systems consists in providing ways to couple these five
processes, that is four couplings.
From a hardware and software point of view, it is crucial to ensure that there exists a
first coupling between the physical process and the probe. Then there are three major HCI
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problems with alarms: their reliability, their perception, and the trust that humans put in
them. A false positive or a false negative can be considered as a failure of the conditions
of the activation of the second coupling between the probe and the alarm display. A
non-perceived alarm can be considered as a failure of the third coupling between the alarm
display and the user. This depends both on the attention level of the user and on the design
of the display and its coupling compatibility with human perceptual means: possible bad
designs could be a single change of colour in peripheral vision [8], or a continuous (non-
evolving) sound in a noisy environment. Finally, the training of the operators aims at
building the fourth coupling between the alarms and well-defined operational rules[64].
Similarly, the level of autonomy of so-called “self-driving” cars can be described according
to the distribution of processes between the automated systems and the driver [59]. In a
level 0 car, the driver maintains multiple processes to steer and regulate speed, to monitor
the direction and the tra c. In a level 1 car, some processes (speed) are maintained by
automated systems. The driver is required to run monitoring processes and to maintain a
physical coupling between her hands and her foot and the input devices to take over control
(assuming that the existing automatic couplings will be disabled in case of emergency i.e.
a process that deactivate the automatic steering or speed control process). In a level 2,
steering is handled by automated systems. The driver is still running a process to monitor
the tra c and the behavior of the car and a process to maintain a physical coupling. By
comparison, in a train the steering process can be considered as the result of the coupling
between the rails and the train wheels. Finally, in a level 3 car, it is the responsability
of the car (a process of the car) to restore a coupling with the driver whenever the car
self-assesses its own inability to perform safely, usually by an alarm.
The above descriptions are rough models of the situations. For instance, they do not
represent the multiple levels of monitoring and questioning that can occur in human brains,
the training processes, nor the subparts of physical systems and their possible behaviors.
But one benefit of the process-oriented description is these models can be refined or enriched
by adding new processes and subprocesses to reach the desired level of accuracy: this
suggests that the approach might be generative.
7.2. Learning, Education and Families. Pilot training is a very interesting example
of pedagogical challenges. In the case of flight Rio-Paris accident in 2009, the authorities
recommended training sessions for the rarely-met events that led to the accident[14]. Vari-
ous processes can be identified and studied. For instance, training is a means to couple an
alarm process to the process of applying a maneuver or procedure. However this coupling
is implemented through human memory, that degrades over time through a process than
can be modeled. Trainers are therefore faced with a choice: either implementing a memory
refresh process through rehearsal sessions (a new process that must be implemented), or
using intensive initial training so as to turn the coupling into a skill, with a much slower
degratation process. Another option could be to ask cockpit designers to find another
implementation for the coupling, using a more explicit alarm or an alarm that triggers a
natural skill.
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The benefit of the process paradigm in this case is the homogeneity it introduces be-
tween phenomena of very di↵erent natures: alarms, skills, training. Reasoning in terms of
processes allows analyses and dialogues among experts from di↵erent backgrounds.
7.3. Interaction Beyond the Individual. Air Tra c Control involves multiple human
actors, co-located or remote, synchronously. To start with, controllers often work in pairs.
At this level, their activity is made of information processing (analysing situations), but also
of communication, interruption and monitoring (warning the teammate about a problem,
choosing a visual or speech modality according to his level of activity). For describing
this activity in order to support it, the concept of process can be directly transposed
from computer science. But beyond mere description, processes can be used as the basis
for architecting future air tra c control systems. For instance, introducing automated
support can be analysed as the selection of processes that can be migrated from humans
to the computer, and as the creation of new monitoring processes.
As for the dialogue with aircraft, it can be described at high level as a collection of
couplings between ground and air systems, in addition to RADAR displays. The design
of future aeronautical systems architectures, with one pilot only per aircraft, with the su-
pervision of several drones by one operator, or formation flights across oceans, becomes
an exercise of assigning processes to pilots, controllers and computers, and creating the
appropriate couplings. For instance, when a controler gives an instruction to a pilot, the
monitoring process she starts to check that the aircraft is complying will probably be
the same with a purely automated aircraft: the delegation process is overall the same.
Reciprocally, some processes currently implemented onboard aircraft will probably be im-
plemented on the ground and the question will be where it is most e cient to implement
them, between air tra c control centers and airline operational centers. Analysing the cost
of creating couplings with other ongoing processes will help make the decision.
The benefit of the process paradigm here is that the analogy that is frequently seen by
computer scientists between distributed systems and collaborative systems finds a natural
expression, without having to reduce one to the other.
7.4. Privacy, Security, and Visualization. There are multiple ways to enforce security
on mobile devices: from digicode, to touch gesture or fingerprint recognition. The IPhone
“FaceID” allows users for unlocking their phone by recognizing their face. FaceID requires
to couple the user and the camera of the phone. When this coupling is active, it triggers
the unlocking of the phone, and triggers a timer that will deactivate the coupling when the
phone is not used during a given period. This interaction assumes that the user is looking
at the phone in front of it, which might be true most of the time. However, there exist
situations where one wants to unlock the phone without being in front of it, for example
as a jury member when turning on a timer when the defense of a dissertation starts. In
this case, a more inconspicuous interaction is needed, e.g fingerprint recognition. Again,
there should be no di↵erence when describing the whole system, whatever the identification
means.
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7.5. Accessibility and Aging. Accessibility characterises the usability of a system for
persons who have di↵erent abilities. This characteristic can be formulated in terms of
processes. To start with, the abilities of the users and the various interaction styles can be
described in terms of processes. For instance, an aging person will have degraded couplings
that can be described with delays or with a lower probability of propagating activation (e.g.
because of lower attention span). Usability can be described as the compatibility between
processes, and evaluated through the probability and the time to reach a given state.
In addition, asking what kind of additional support can be provided to, e.g., elderly
users can be reduced to asking what additional processes must be designed, for instance
a monitoring process to detect incomplete interaction sequences and trigger alarms. With
this regard, the connections between accessibility and safety-critical systems is easy to
establish with process-oriented analysis: the same redundancy patterns are present and
can be verified.
Finally, from the engineering point of view, accessibility often requires the ability to
substitute one process by another, for instance s static display with an animation, a gesture
by a sequence of button presses, etc. Being able to reducing these heterogenous mechanisms
to a homogenous concept reduces the engineering complexity.
7.6. Design. The activity of designing interactions necessitates three processes: under-
stand the needs, ideate/synthesize, and assess the design. User-centered design stipulates
that users be considered as the central focus by designers. Designers should first under-
stand the needs by analyzing users, then ideate and synthesize the design, and finally come
back to users. Participatory design stipulates that users be part of the designers. This
shortens the cycle, and better ensures that new features stick to users’ needs. Presumptive
design gets rid of the understanding aspect, replacing it by fast, disposable protototypes
to make users react often and guide the design[29]. The di↵erences between the three ap-
proaches can be described with increasing amount of coupling between users and designers,
and increasing amount of couplings between the three processes understand, design, assess.
7.7. Interaction techniques, Devices and Modalities. Being able to describe inter-
action techniques unambiguously and completely is essential to the field: not only can it
prevent implementation errors and facilitate teaching, it also allows to analyse and com-
pare the properties of techniques. With this regard, the Keystroke Level Model can be
interpreted as relying on a clever serialization of the processes that describe common in-
teraction styles. Thimbleby’s work on medical devices can then be interpreted as the use
of other mathematical tools (e.g. graphs) to compute properties of interaction techniques
from a formal description of processes [78]. In this context, the use of parallelism, state
machines or data flows to describe interaction techniques can be paralleled to their use in
the SysML language to describe processes in systems engineering: the same syntaxes are
used in two di↵erent domains, the common ground being un underlying process-based de-
scription. Parallelism, state machine and data-flows are examples of organising collections
of couplings in well known patterns or control structures.
One can also use processes and couplings to analyse how interaction modalities match
the use context. For instance, Virtual Reality (VR) goggles isolate the user from the outside
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world, breaking some couplings between the user and the world In contrast, Augmented
Reality (AR) goggles superimpose artificial imagery on top of the real world: the user is
still able to perceive the surrounding world. In other words, the user’s eyes are still coupled
to real objects. AR also adds coupling between real objects, virtual ones, and the user:
positions, or actions that can be triggered with gestures on real or virtual objects. AR is
thus more about adding interactional capability instead of computational capability.
7.8. Understanding People: Theory, Concepts, Methods. Fitts’ law has given birth
to many research on how to beat it[7]. For example, McGu n and Balakrishnan [13]
(hereafter M&B) suggested a way of facilitating pointing with no permanent spatial cost
by temporarily expanding the target during the end of the approach. They found that
performance benefited from target expansion even when the target only began to expand
as late as after 90% of the movement toward the target. However, M&B massed their static
and expanding targets in separate blocks of trials, thus making expansion predictable for
participants. Zhai&al (ZCGB) replicated their experiment with one new condition in which
the target could unpredictably expand, shrink, or stay unchanged. ZCGB results show that
target expansion occurring as late as in M&B’s experiment enhances pointing performance
in the absence of expectation.
A process-oriented account of these experiments can be done as follows. M&B condition
is the simple addition to the canoncial 1D Fitts task of a process that monitors the distance
between the cursor and the target, and a coupling that triggers a scaling by two of the
target width when the distance reaches a given value. ZCGB unpredictable condition is
the same process, with a random choice among 3 scaling values (2.0 - expand, 1.0 - static,
0.5 - shrink).
Theoretically, M&B’s findings supports a long line of thinking in human motor control.
An old theory postulates there is a two-phase theory in rapid reaching movement - ballistic
and current control [89], with the first phase being open-loop and the second closed-loop.
A more recent theory is that of [54], which postulates an optimized trade-o↵ between the
first and second phase. Since only the second phase involves feedback control, it is plausible
that a target that expands just before the second phase of control is begun is as good as a
target that has that larger size permanently. Given that human closed-loop reaction time
takes about 100-200 ms [68], it wass surprising that one can still take full advantage of the
expanded target at so late a stage (90%) in movement execution.
In other words, two processes govern the task: a vision process, and a hand-control
process. The ’open-loop’ theory stipulates that there is no coupling between the two
processes during roughly half of the gesture, while a coupling between the eye and the
hand is established to aim at the target at the end of the gesture. The ’close-loop’ theory
stipulates that the coupling is present all along the gesture. In both cases, the coupling
adds a delay (100-200 ms) between the two processes.
7.9. Engineering Interactive Systems and Technologies. While it is not unusual to
find a process vocabulary to describe physical or cognitive phenomena, we do not find any
equivalence in the field of computer science, apart from very specific works cited above.
However, our process-based analysis of human-machine interaction also suggests another
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view point over programming. Indeed, our claim is that the aim of the HCI designers is
to build links between processes (cognitive processes, bodily movements, environmental
changes, computer processes, etc.). In other words, they want to enable and to control the
couplings between processes.
This view delineates a crucial mission for the field of HCI, that is the elaboration of the
languages and tools to model and control causal links between processes in computer-based
systems. At the programming level this notably consists in elaborating a process-oriented
language equipped with control structures explicitly dedicated to the handling of causal
links. When the designer specifies a relation such as “each time the user moves the cursor
over the button, its appearance has to change”, the programmer should have at her disposal
a simple control structure reflecting it, something allowing to express “when Process A then
Process B”. Following our process-based ontology, this language should allow A and B to
be any kind of processes: a sensor, a processor clock, an user input, a software process,
etc. Moreover, this control structure should itself be construed as a process, that is as
something that can be active or inactive. With all these features, such a control structure
is the equivalent of a coupling as we defined it above. It can be complicated so as to
account for the variety of causal relationships: fork, when Process A then Process B and
Process C, conjunction, when Process A and Process B then Process C, probabilistic link,
full determinism, etc.
Various kinds of control structures should be elaborated according to the specificities
of the processes that one wants to connect through a coupling. If one wants to react
to a continuous signal such as a change in luminosity or in temperature, one needs a
control structure akin to a data-flow operator, that is a process that propagates change
in a continuous way. To the contrary, if one wants to react to a pattern, with a specific
ordered sequence of events (e.g. a finger touching a tactile surface, moving on it, then
leaving it), one needs a more complex control structure such as a finite state machine.
We have shown in a recent work [4], that all these control structures can be derived from
the basic control structure expressing the coupling between processes. As a consequence,
it becomes possible to build full-fledge interaction-oriented programming languages. These
approach and languages have been proved to be plainly usable for designing complex in-
teractive systems [3, 5].
8. Implications
We have shown how the use of a process ontology to describe all parts of an interactive
system makes them comparable, and fixes their apparent “impedance mismatch”. The
alarm example involves hardware, software, human perception, learning and rule-based
actions, all described in the same manner. This homogeneity facilitates the substitution of
one process by another one, possibly of a di↵erent nature, provided that it has the same
structure, thus allowing equivalent couplings with other processes or possibly enabling new
ones. The “fly-by-wire” flight control system is an example of the replacement of mechanical
processes by electronic ones. While most of the couplings are preserved, new ones become
possible such as that with an automatic system to enable auto-pilot functionalities.
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Moreover, by focusing on the couplings, the analysis may unveil those that have been
lost during such a substitution and that could weaken the whole system. Thus, in the
fly-by-wire example, force feedback may be artificially reproduced to maintain a physical
coupling with the co-pilot, which may be important for shared situation awareness. This
may play an important role in an iterative design process where process substitution (input
modalities, visualisations, procedure, etc.) is a common practice.
Another important aspect of coupling is that of its “quality”: its strength (the ex-
tent to which it influences the destination process) and robustness (the extent to which
it holds despite other weaknening processes). For example, human vision is a coupling
that can be impaired in case of smoke, or during the night. The motor/vision coupling
can be strengthen using ”beat-the-Fitts-law” techniques : in this case, speed and errors
are dimensions of measurement of the quality of the coupling. This open the way for a
quantitative evaluation of the couplings, and thus of the whole interactive system.
One could wonder how such an approach could help HCI designers in their activity. By
removing the accidental complexity due to the impedance mismatch, it might be easier for
them to understand the system as a whole, and eliminate design problems hidden by the
mismatch. Since the approach can also be directly operationalised into code, it might be
easier for them to implement interactive systems, and iterate in parallel models and their
implementation.
9. Threats to validity
To assess the internal validity of our apporach, we gave some examples on how it can
be used to model phenomena related to interactive systems. Even if the examples cover a
significant span of HCI concerns (9 out of 13 subcommittees), a lot of work remains to be
done.
First, the present analysis does not show that most of HCI concerns is actually covered.
More work needs to be done to assess how the approach actually captures interesting
aspects of other HCI concerns, and how this leads to interesting insights or to interesting
conceptual tools for designers.
Second, the analysis might be not deep enough. Granted, we argued that the depth
of the analysis may be varied according to the scale at which designers want to reason,
but it remains to be proven with more examples that such method would give interesting
outcomes.
Third, the approach is mainly descriptive as-of-today, even if some of it might be gen-
erative as it gives insight on how a particular process could be replaced by another one.
Nothing prevents the use of current models and theories when they provide more pow-
erful modelling (e.g. predictive), in parallel to the presented approach. However, work
remains to be done to make the approach more powerful e.g. in a predictive and possibily
quantitative manner.
Finally, to be e↵ective, a more complete process ontology must be carefully elaborated.
We have seen how the structure of a process may determine its causal influence. To
understand these relationships, it is crucial to elaborate a complete set of concepts allowing
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to characterise, compare, or classify, the various kinds of processes. An inspiring work could
be that of J. Seibt [70]. She proposes to provide the ontological foundation for any research
program that wants to give the first place to the concepts of “process” and “interaction”
through a conceptual framework to analyse the properties of a process. For example one
may be interested by its property of auto-similarity, the fact that a (temporal) part of the
process of raining is still a process of raining, by di↵erence with a symphony whose parts
are not themselves a symphony. More generally, we need a vocabulary, possibly formal, to
describe the varieties of the spatial and temporal properties of processes.
10. Conclusion
Rejecting the computation paradigm, we proposed an approach to human-computer in-
teraction by taking as the basic building blocks the concepts of process and coupling. We
showed how such an approach can be exploited for the modelling and the design of interac-
tive systems, and how it can be used as the theoretical background for the elaboration of
an interaction-oriented programming language. Much work remains to be done to confirm
and consolidate this theoretical proposal, which goes from formal work on the basic process
ontology to its application to the various aspects of human-computer interaction. But we
are confident that this theory could provide to the HCI community with a clear conceptual
framework, with a unified set of concepts and a common approach to scientific issues. Such
a framework might enable to structure the variety of works done in the field, and would
provide a basis for discussion and collaboration.
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2012.
[15] Stuart K. Card, Allen Newell, and Thomas P. Moran. The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction.
Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1983.
[16] Anthony Chemero. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. MIT Press, 2011.
[17] Noam Chomsky. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965.
[18] Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher Koch, and Terry J. Sejnowski. What is computational neuro-
science? In Eric L. Schwartz, editor, Computational Neuroscience. MIT Press, 1990.
[19] Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers. The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1):7–19, 1998.
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